Jürgen Habermas y la problemática de la neutralidad valorativa:

¿es posible una ciencia social crítica?

Abstract

One of the epistemological problems that arise in the social sciences is the question of the objectivity of knowledge. At the bottom of the discussion is the following point: Is it possible to think about a neutral social science without values?. Addressing the discussion from a critical perspective, allows us to suggest some grounds for meaning to the role of social sciences in modern society. Habermas gives us a look at the possibility of recreating the scientific objectivity that opens an interesting range of opportunities to analyze the conditions of knowledge production in social sciences. Jurgen Habermas, heir to the thought of Frankfurt, develops its approach to objectivity in science from a social logic of understanding in terms of communication process. It is possible to raise the objectivity but, according to this author, it is not possible to defend the value-neutrality. Habermas thinks that de postulate of value neutrality shows us that the empirical-analytical procedures are not capable to undestand the reference regarding the life in which, in reality, they find themselves objectively. Work on the notions of objectivity and value neutrality enriches intellectuall work and strengthens the possibility of holding a critical social science.